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Abstract. In this paper, we present and defend a natural yet novel analysis of 
normative reasons. According to what we call support-explanationism, for a fact 
to be a normative reason to φ is for it to explain why there’s normative support 
for φ-ing. We critically consider the two main rival forms of explanationism—
ought-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about ought, and good-
explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about goodness—as well as the 
popular Reasons-First view, which takes the notion of a normative reason to be 
normatively fundamental. Support-explanationism, we argue, enjoys many of 
the virtues of these views while avoiding their drawbacks. We conclude by 
exploring several further important implications: among other things, we argue 
that the influential metaphor of ‘weighing’ reasons is inapt, and propose a better 
one; that, contrary to what Berker (2019) suggests, there’s no reason for non-
naturalists about normativity to accept the Reasons-First view; and that, 
contrary to what Wodak (2020b) suggests, explanationist views can successfully 
accommodate what he calls ‘redundant reasons’. 
1. Introduction 
What do reasons do? Despite the high generality of this question, it has an answer 
that’s both popular and plausible: reasons explain. 
For many kinds of reasons, the idea that reasons explain seems close to 
undeniable. For example, when we say that the explosion is the reason (or reason 
why) the bridge collapsed, or that the pandemic is the reason the economy collapsed, 
this seems equivalent to saying that the explosion explains why the bridge collapsed, 
and that the pandemic explains why the economy collapsed. It’s no wonder, then, 
that such reasons are standardly called explanatory reasons. Something similar is true 
of so-called motivating reasons—i.e., the kinds of things we invoke when we say that 
Talia’s reason for becoming a doctor is to help people, or that Herman’s reason for 
believing it rained is that the streets are wet. While the details are controversial, 
motivating reasons are standardly taken to be considerations which explain, in a 





In addition to explanatory and motivating reasons, however, there are also 
normative reasons. These are the sorts of reasons we invoke when we say that the fact 
that the street is wet is a reason to believe it has rained, or the fact that donating to 
charity helps alleviate suffering is a reason to do it. Can the idea that reasons explain 
be extended to the normative domain? Though less obvious, such an extension is 
appealing. Besides the relatively superficial point that we use the count noun 
‘reason(s)’ to express claims about both, the connection between normative reasons 
and explanation is motivated by reflecting on cases and, more generally, by the 
practice of normative ethics and other normative disciplines. To illustrate, suppose 
that: 
(1) Polluting the environment is morally wrong because it causes unnecessary 
harm.  
Given (1), it is natural to accept both of the following: 
(2) The fact that polluting causes unnecessary harm is a (or: the) reason not to 
pollute. 
(3) The fact that polluting causes unnecessary harm is a (or: the) reason why 
pollution is morally wrong.  
In this example, (1) says that a certain fact about polluting explains its moral status, 
(2) says that the same fact about polluting is a moral reason against it, and (3) says 
that the same fact about polluting is an explanatory reason in relation to its moral 
status. These claims are clearly closely related—so much so that normative theorists 
often go back and forth between them, seemingly without hesitation. 
Our aim in this paper is to vindicate and illuminate the close connection between 
normative reasons and explanation—a task we take to be a constraint on any 
adequate account of normative reasons.1 In particular, we defend a version of (what 
we call) explanationism about normative reasons. On explanationist views, facts about 
normative reasons are analyzed as facts about what explains what, and what makes 
normative reasons normative (as opposed to merely explanatory) is the normativity of 
what is explained. (Henceforth we’ll refer to normative reasons simply as ‘reasons’.) 
To date, two main forms of explanationism have been defended: ought-explanationism, 
where reasons explain facts about what we ought to do (Broome, 2013), and good-
                                                   
1 Hence, while there are views of normative reasons that sever the seemingly-intimate 
connection to explanation, we think such views are (other things being equal) at a 
disadvantage, and engaging with them is beyond the scope of this paper. One example is the 
view of reasons as premises of good reasoning (see e.g. Hieronymi, 2005; Setiya, 2014; Way, 
2017). Another is the view of reasons as evidence (see e.g. Kearns & Star, 2008, 2009; Thomson, 




explanationism, where reasons explain facts about what is good (Finlay, 2014).2 While 
these views accommodate the idea that reasons explain, they also face important 
objections. We’ll defend a novel alternative: support-explanationism, according to 
which reasons explain facts about normative support. This view, we’ll argue, retains 
the strengths of its explanationist competitors while avoiding their weaknesses. 
The distinction between reasons and support is subtle but substantial: it’s an 
instance of the intuitively clear—and metaphysically real—distinction between a 
source or provider of something (in this case, being a reason) and that which it is a 
source or provider of (in this case, normative support). A recurring theme of this 
paper is that subtleties such as these matter, and paying attention to them pays off. 
In particular, doing so reveals the superiority of support-explanationism over another 
influential view of reasons: the one commonly called Reasons-First (see, e.g., Scanlon, 
1998, 2014; Raz, 1999; Skorupski, 2002, 2010; Schroeder, 2007, 2021, forthcoming; 
Lord, 2018; Rowland, 2019). According to Reasons-First, reasons-facts—i.e., facts of 
the form [r is a reason for S to φ]—are normatively fundamental, and all other 
normative facts can ultimately be explained in terms of them. As we’ll argue, many 
considerations that have been taken to favor Reasons-First—such as the slogan that 
‘you ought to do what you have most reason to do’—are more straightforwardly and 
naturally accommodated by support-explanationism. Indeed, once we pay closer 
attention to the details concerning reasons, explanation, and the relation between 
them, it becomes clear that they actually speak against the idea that reasons-facts are 
normatively first, or otherwise fundamental. The plausibility of Reasons-First has 
thus been largely illusory, and is mainly a result of the view not being sufficiently 
distinguished from nearby but importantly different ones, such as ours. 
The paper is structured as follows. After some methodological preliminaries in 
§2, we argue against competing explanationist views and diagnose their central flaws 
in §3. This sets the stage for our articulation and defense of support-explanationism 
in §4, where we contrast it favorably with its explanationist competitors as well as 
Reasons-First. We then consider a variety of implications of our view: among other 
things, we’ll argue that the influential metaphor of ‘weighing’ reasons is inapt, and 
propose a better one (§4.3); that, contrary to what Selim Berker (2019) suggests, there’s 
                                                   
2 A related view analyzes practical normative reasons in terms of explanation and rightness 
(cf. Schroeter & Schroeter, 2009). A more recent explanationist account seeks to analyze 
normative reasons in terms of explanation and fittingness (cf. Howard, 2019). We discuss the 
latter view, and a dilemma it faces, in footnote 9. Another family of views analyzes normative 
reasons in terms of explanation and promotion. The idea (roughly put) is that r is a reason to φ 
iff r explains why φ-ing would help promote some relevant objective (such as value or the 
satisfaction of the agent’s preferences). While we lack the space to discuss these views here, 
we believe they’re susceptible to problems we’ll present for good-explanationism in §3.2. For 
further critical discussion of promotionalism, see Bedke (2008) and Behrends and DiPaolo 




no reason for non-naturalists about normativity to accept the Reasons-First program 
(§5.1); and that, contrary to what Daniel Wodak (2020b) suggests, explanationist 
views can successfully accommodate what he calls redundant reasons (§5.2).  
2. Methodological Preliminaries: Reasons and Explanation 
Before elaborating on support-explanationism and critically considering alternatives, 
we need to be clear about the target: normative reasons. There are various locutions 
we ordinarily use to talk about normative reasons, such as: 
 
(NR1)    r is a reason (for S/that S has) to φ. 
 ‘The fact that it’s cold is a reason (for Sasha/that Sasha has) to stay inside.’ 
(NR2)    S has a reason to φ. 
 ‘Sasha has a reason to stay inside.’ 
(NR3)    There is a reason (for S) to φ. 
 ‘There is a reason (for Sasha) to stay inside.’ 
 
Part of what distinguishes normative reasons is obvious: unlike other kinds of 
reasons, normative reasons are normative. We won’t pretend to offer an informative 
analysis of what it is to be normative, though in §4 we will offer an informative 
analysis of what it is to be a normative reason. 
Another way to distinguish normative reasons from other kinds of reasons is by 
focusing on the theoretical roles they play. Various heuristics for identifying 
normative reasons have been proposed (cf. Schroeder, 2007; Lord, 2018; Maguire & 
Snedegar, 2021). For example, normative reasons have been variously described as 
things which: 
(R1)   count in favor of some agent’s action or attitude φ. 
(R2)   explain why an agent ought or is permitted to φ. 
(R3)   are suitable as premises in good reasoning about whether to φ. 
(R4)   could be offered as a justification by an agent for φ-ing. 
(R5)   could be offered as advice to an agent in support of φ-ing.  
We’ll focus on (R1) and (R2), since we take them to be the most theoretically central 
roles normative reasons play.3 
We can thus identify normative reasons by the locutions we use to talk about them 
as well as various theoretical roles that they are assumed to play. This is how 
metanormative debates often proceed. What’s less often noted, however, is that 
there’s a tension at the heart of this methodology. In particular, as has been argued 
                                                   
3 It’s of course possible to use ‘reason(s)’ to refer to something that, say, only plays the (R5)-




elsewhere (see, e.g., Fogal 2016a, 2018; Maguire & Snedegar 2021), there’s a tension 
between (a) assuming that normative reasons play the theoretical roles just 
mentioned and (b) assigning significant evidential weight to the ordinary normative 
judgments we’re inclined to make using ‘reason(s)’. To see why, suppose Candice 
looks through a window and sees a room filled with smoke. In a discussion of what 
reasons she has to believe there’s a fire, you might say either of the following: 
(i) The fact that smoke is a sign of fire is a reason for Candice to believe there’s 
a fire. 
(ii) That fact that she sees smoke is a reason for Candice to believe there’s a fire. 
(iii) The fact that there’s smoke in the room is a reason for Candice to believe 
there’s a fire. 
But it would be unacceptable to say any of them in combination, such as: 
(iv) The fact that she sees smoke is a reason for Candice to believe there’s a fire, 
and so is the fact that there is smoke in the room. 
(v) Candice sees smoke, there is smoke in the room, and smoke is a sign of fire, 
so she has three reasons to believe there’s a fire. 
In such a context, sentences like (iv) and (v) are guilty of double- and triple-
counting—the facts cited as reasons don’t separately count in favor of the relevant 
belief.4 This suggests that ordinary ‘reason(s)’-judgments often fail to directly track 
the things that play the relevant theoretical roles—like (R1)—that reasons are 
supposed to play. Such judgments also arguably fail to reliably track those roles. For 
example, many philosophers deny that the fact that the subject can φ is itself a 
reason—or part of a reason—for her to φ, and instead insist that such facts play some 
other role (such as an ‘enabling’ role). Nonetheless, there are many contexts in which 
it’s perfectly acceptable to cite the fact that one can φ as a reason to φ. These include 
contexts in which φ is obviously choiceworthy—e.g. ‘The fact that you can help 
someone in need is a reason to do so’—as well as those in which one isn’t usually able 
to φ—e.g. ‘The fact that you’re able to ask the President a question right now is a 
reason to do so.’ 
The methodological tension just noted can be resolved by distinguishing 
between ordinary uses of ‘reason(s)’—uses of the term in ordinary thought and talk—
and more theoretical (and hence semi-technical) uses of ‘reason(s)’—uses of the term 
                                                   
4 For other examples that illustrate this point, see Fogal (2016a; 2018) and Maguire and 
Snedegar (2021). It’s common to distinguish between basic reasons and derivative reasons. Basic 
reasons are the primary sources of normative support, whereas derivative reasons are “only 
reasons in virtue of their relationships to the [basic] ones” (Maguire & Snedegar, 2021: 366). 
Thus, even if some or all of the facts cited in (iv) and (v) count as derivative reasons, they don’t 




by theorists meant to track facts that play various theoretical roles. Many 
philosophers want to deny that the fact that you can φ is itself something that counts 
in favor of φ-ing (recall (R1)) or makes it the case that you ought, or are permitted, to 
φ (recall (R2)). If they’re right, then that fact isn’t a reason in the relevant theoretical 
sense. Nonetheless, there are plenty of contexts in which that fact is perfectly fine to 
cite as a reason, and hence counts as such in the ordinary sense. 
One way to distinguish between ordinary and more theoretical uses of ‘reason(s)’ 
is by considering the kind of explanation the relevant facts provide. As noted above, 
one of the central theoretical roles normative reasons play is explaining other 
normative facts, such as facts about what subjects ought or are permitted to do. 
Normative theorists aren’t typically interested in just any kind of explanation of such 
facts, however. When asking why some subject S ought to φ, for example, normative 
theorists typically want to know what makes it the case that S ought to φ, or what it is 
in virtue of which S ought to φ. Like many others, we take this to be an instance of a 
non-causal, non-pragmatic kind of explanation that commonly goes under the 
heading of ‘metaphysical’ or ‘grounding’ explanation.5 This is different from the 
looser, everyday notion of explanation, which we’ll call ‘pragmatic’ explanation. This 
is the sort of thing that we standardly ask for and provide concerning a variety of 
subject matters, and whose success depends on “facts about the interests, beliefs or 
other features of the psychology of those providing or receiving the explanation [or] 
the ‘context’ in which the explanation occurs” (Woodward & Ross, 2021: §6.1). In 
slogan form, we should distinguish between ‘explains’ in the sense of makes it the case 
(i.e., non-pragmatic explanation) and ‘explains’ in the sense of makes sense of why it’s 
the case (i.e., pragmatic explanation). Although knowing what makes something the 
case will often help make sense of why it’s the case, one shouldn’t assume that 
pragmatic and non-pragmatic explanations are neatly aligned. Something might 
make something else the case without making sense of why it’s the case—e.g. we 
might lack relevant background information—and something might make sense of 
why something else is the case without making it the case—e.g. we’re often content 
with information that merely gestures at the real explanatory story. 
The two distinctions just made—between ordinary and theoretical uses of 
‘reasons’ and between pragmatic and non-pragmatic explanations—are closely 
related. Whereas reasons in the ordinary sense provide pragmatic explanations—they 
help make sense of why things are the way they are—reasons in the theoretical sense 
provide non-pragmatic explanations—they help make it the case that things are the 
way they are. The theoretical notion of a reason is thus related to, but nonetheless 
                                                   
5 This paragraph is indebted to Fogal and Risberg (2020). For more on the metaphysics of 
normative explanations, see Rosen (2017) and Berker (2018). For an explanation of why 
expressivists (who otherwise tend to eschew metaphysics) also need an account of normative 




distinct from, the ordinary notion, and the former can be seen as a precisification of 
the latter. 
We say all this to be clear: our focus in what follows is on normative reasons in 
the relevant theoretical sense. However, metanormative theorists are often less-than-
transparent with respect to their methodology, and don’t always draw the same 
distinctions we think should be drawn, which can make exegesis a fraught affair. It’s 
nonetheless plain that metanormative theorists are typically interested in more-than-
merely-pragmatic explanations.6 In particular, when it comes to (R2) above, the 
explanations that reasons provide are not supposed to depend on anyone’s interests 
or information: normative reasons are supposed to help make it the case that someone 
ought or is permitted to do something, not merely help make sense of why it’s the 
case. This is what we’re calling a theoretical use of ‘(normative) reason(s)’. 
Two last preliminaries are in order. First, in what follows we’ll consider a number 
of different explanationist views concerning the nature of normative reasons, all of 
which deny that the reasons-relation is normatively fundamental. Each view takes 
the following canonical form: for r to be a reason for S to φ is for r to ______, where r 
is a fact or true proposition, S is a subject, and φ is an action, attitude, feeling, or 
whatever else there can be reasons to do or have. Each view appeals to a different 
normative notion in filling in the blank, specifying non-trivial necessary and 
sufficient conditions that together state what it is for something to be a normative 
reason, and thereby providing an informative account or analysis of the nature of 
reasons—one that entails the reasons-relation is not normatively fundamental. To 
deny that such an analysis can be provided is to accept Reasons Fundamentalism, which 
is one of two central tenets of the Reasons-First view.7 The other is Reasons Imperialism, 
which claims that every other normative property and relation can be analyzed in 
terms of the reasons-relation. The Reasons-First view is thus the conjunction of 
Reasons Fundamentalism and Reasons Imperialism.8 Lastly, although we will 
sometimes use the fudge term ‘notion’ to cover both concepts and properties, we will 
primarily be operating in a metaphysical mode throughout the paper. A similar 
(though not identical) debate could nevertheless be had at the conceptual level. 
Theorists who are afraid of metaphysics but comforted by concepts can translate 
accordingly. 
                                                   
6 Typically but not always. Finlay (2014), for example, is a prominent exception. 
7 Note that Reasons Fundamentalism only requires that the reasons-relation be normatively 
fundamental; it’s compatible with that relation being metaphysically non-fundamental (cf. 
Schroeder, 2007). 
8 We’re glossing over some further distinctions, since they won’t be relevant in what follows. 
For example, one can distinguish between a version of Reasons-First formulated in terms of 
grounding and a version formulated in terms of analysis (cf. Schroeder, forthcoming), and 
between giving a metaphysical analysis of some property (cf. Dorr, 2016) and giving an 




3. Explanationism: Against Ought- and Good-based Views 
3.1 Ought-Explanationism about Reasons 
John Broome (2004, 2013) has defended a version of explanationism that focuses on 
facts about what we ought to do. The simplest version of this view is as follows: 
Simple ought-explanationism: For r to be a reason for S to φ is for r to explain 
why S ought to φ.9 
While this view makes straightforward sense of the connection between reasons and 
explanation (cf. §1), it also faces an obvious problem: we often have reasons to do 
things that we ought not do, since we have ‘stronger’ or ‘weighter’ reasons to do 
something else instead. For example, the fact that soda is tasty might be a reason for 
Nils to drink soda, but if there are other, weightier reasons not to do so—for example, 
that soda is unhealthy—then the fact that soda is tasty will be outweighed: it’s a reason 
to do something (i.e. to drink soda) that Nils, ultimately, ought not to do. Given that 
explanation is factive, an outweighed reason to φ can’t explain why we ought to φ, 
since it’s false that we ought to φ. The possibility of outweighed reasons is thus 
incompatible with simple ought-explanationism. 
Broome recognizes this problem (Broome, 2013: ch. 4.3). His solution is to 
distinguish between two kinds of reasons: pro toto and pro tanto. According to Broome, 
simple ought-explanationism is true of pro toto reasons, but not of pro tanto reasons: 
a pro toto reason for S to φ is a fact that explains why S ought to φ, whereas a pro tanto 
reason for S to φ is a fact that plays a certain role in a ‘weighing explanation’ of why 
S ought (or ought not) to φ.10 A weighing explanation of an ought-fact is one that 
appeals to the weight of reasons: S ought to φ if (and because) the reasons for φ-ing 
outweigh the reasons against φ-ing, and S ought not to φ if (and because) the reasons 
against φ-ing outweigh the reasons for φ-ing. Not all explanations of ought-facts are 
                                                   
9 Simple ought-explanationism resembles some other explanationist views, including fitting-
explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about fittingness. Fitting-explanationism is 
hinted at, but not developed, by Chappell (2012: 688), and a disjunctive variant of it is 
advanced by Howard (2019). It is difficult to assess such views, however, since important 
questions remain concerning how the relevant notion of fittingness should be understood—
Howard (2018: 8), for example, concludes his survey by listing several important and so-far-
unaddressed questions about how best to understand it). Nonetheless, depending on how the 
view is developed, it will likely face a dilemma. If the central notion of fittingness does not 
come in degrees—e.g. if fittingness is identified with correctness—then the corresponding 
form of explanationism will face problems similar to those facing ought-explanationism 
discussed in this section. On the other hand, if the relevant notion does come in degrees, then 
the view risks being a confusingly-formulated notational variant of the view that we’ll defend 
in §4, and thus not a genuine competitor to it. 
10 Or in a weighing explanation of why it’s not the case that S ought to φ and not the case that 




weighing explanations, according to Broome, but many are, and pro tanto reasons are 
defined by the role they play in such: for r to be a pro tanto reason for S to φ is for r 
to play the ‘for-φ’ role in a weighing explanation, and for r to be a pro tanto reason 
for S not to φ is for r to play the ‘against-φ’ role in such an explanation. Both pro toto 
and pro tanto reasons help explain facts about what you ought to do, though they do 
so in different ways. Thus: 
Broomean ought-explanationism: For r to be a reason for S to φ is for r to 
either (i) explain why S ought to φ [pro toto reasons] or (ii) play the for-φ role 
in a weighing explanation of why S ought (or ought not) to φ [pro tanto 
reasons]. 
Broome’s analysis has been extensively criticized. We’ll focus on three criticisms of 
his analysis of pro tanto reasons specifically—namely, (a) it is uninformative, (b) the 
notion of normative weight remains unexplained, and (c) the weighing metaphor is 
inapt. All three will be useful points of contrast to the view we’ll develop in §4.11 
First, it has been argued that our understanding of what it is for facts to play the 
‘for-φ’ or ‘against-φ’ role in a weighing explanation rests on a prior, more basic 
understanding of what it is for facts to count in favor of or against φ-ing, rather than 
vice versa, and that Broome therefore fails to provide an informative, noncircular 
analysis of reasons (cf. Kearns & Star, 2008; Brunero, 2013; Dancy, 2015).12 
Second, Broome’s account of weighing explanations assumes that reasons have 
normative ‘weights’ that combine in some way to determine what an agent ought to 
do. However, Broome says nothing about the weight(s) of reasons or how they are 
determined, other than that they play this characteristic role (cf. Kearns & Star, 2008; 
Dancy, 2015). So even if (contrary to the first objection) Broome successfully provides 
an informative analysis of reasons in terms of ought, he doesn’t provide an analysis 
                                                   
11 Additional criticisms we won’t consider concern Broome’s notion of a pro toto reason (cf. 
Brunero, 2013; Dancy, 2015; Nebel, 2019) as well as the disjunctive nature of Broome’s account. 
For instance, Nebel (2019) is sympathetic with Broome’s view, but thinks it comes “at the cost 
of an objectionably disjunctive account of normative reasons” (2019: 462; cf. Kearns & Star, 
2008). Instead, Nebel defends the more simple view that “a (normative) reason for S to φ is 
just an (explanatory) reason why S ought to φ” (2019: 462). This counts as a form of ought-
explanationism, assuming that for something to be an explanatory reason why p is for it to 
help explain why p. Interestingly, however, Nebel denies that ‘reason why p’ is factive with 
respect to p, and hence denies that explanatory reasons are just explanations (since ‘explains 
why p’ is factive). While engaging with Nebel’s view is beyond the scope of this paper, it’s 
worth noting that Nebel is only concerned to defend the simple ought-based view from an 
objection, not to motivate it vis-à-vis its competitors, and the central data regarding the limited 
factivity of ‘reason why p’ is compatible with competing analyses of reasons, including ours. 
12 Broome (2013: 54–55) addresses this worry. For convincing responses to Broome’s response, 
see Kearns and Star (2008: 43–44), who (rather than being oracles) were responding to a pre-




of the weight of reasons in terms of ought. Moreover, it’s not clear that he could 
provide such an analysis, since when an ought-fact admits of a weighing explanation, 
the ought-fact will obtain in virtue of facts about the weights of reasons. Assuming the 
relevant kind of explanation is asymmetric, the facts about weight(s) can’t then obtain 
in virtue of the ought-fact. 
One reaction to this problem is to simply take the notion of normative weight as 
primitive. Doing so, however, is in tension with Broome’s ought-centric picture, and 
it also suggests a much simpler account of reasons: for a fact to be a normative reason 
is for it to have normative weight. This points in the direction of the proposal we’ll 
be defending in §4. At this stage, however, what matters is just that such a weight-
based view is very different from ought-explanationism. 
The third problem we’ll consider besets both Broomean ought-explanationism 
and the simple weight-based view just mentioned, as it concerns the idea of 
normative weighing explanations. These explanations are supposed to be analogous 
to mechanical weighing explanations (cf. Broome, 2013: 52), where individual 
weights are placed on either side of a scale and the combined weight of each side 
determines whether the scale tips—and if so which way and by how much it tips. 
Similarly, in normative weighing explanations, there are reasons for and against an 
action, each of which has a normative ‘weight’, and the combined weight of each 
‘side’ determines whether or not the action ought to be done. As John Hawthorne and 
Ofra Magidor (2018) note, however, the analogy is not obviously apt: for example, 
whereas “plac-ing weights on a balance is a monotonic process (in the sense that 
placing more weights on one pan can only increase the total weight on that pan), and 
it is additive (to deter-mine how much total weight there is on one pan of the balance, 
one simply adds the weights)”, it’s controversial whether the process of “balancing 
reasons” has these features (133). Broome himself recognizes these limitations of the 
weighing analogy, as well as others (2013: 52). However, as Hawthorne and Magidor 
also note, if the weights of reasons do not add up or interact in the way that the 
weights of objects add up or interact, then the nature of normative weighing 
explanations (which Broome characterizes via the weighing analogy) as well as of 
normative reasons (which Broome characterizes in terms of normative weighing 
explanations) becomes significantly less clear.13 
While these problems for ought-explanationism may not be decisive on their own, 
they together motivate the search for an alternative that avoids them. 
3.2 Good-Explanationism about Reasons 
The second view we’ll consider is good-explanationism. Here’s a first pass: 
                                                   





Good-explanationism: For r to be a reason for S to φ is for r to explain why 
S’s φ-ing would be good (in some way, to some degree). 
Good-explanationism improves over simple ought-explanationism because it 
straightforwardly accommodates outweighed reasons. That’s because goodness is 
gradable—things can be more or less good, and some good things are better than 
others—and an action that ought not to be performed can still be good to some 
degree. In such a case, a fact that explains why the sub-optimal action is good to some 
degree counts, on this view, as a reason to do it. For example, the fact that soda is 
tasty might explain why Nils’ drinking soda is good to some degree, even if, all things 
considered, Nils ought not to drink soda. Good-explanationism also avoids the 
problems for Broomean ought-explanationism outlined above, as it doesn’t invoke 
the idea of a weighing explanation in its analysis of what it is to be a reason. 
The most prominent advocate of good-explanationism is Stephen Finlay (e.g., 
Finlay, 2014, 2019; see also Gardner & Macklem, 2004; Maguire, 2016; Wedgwood, 
ms). Some care is called for, however, because Finlay’s subject matter and 
methodology differ importantly from our own (cf. §2). What Finlay aims to do is to 
offer a semantics for normative terms, including (but not limited to) the count noun 
‘reason(s)’, that captures their meaning and use in ordinary communication. He then 
uses his semantics as a guide in answering various conceptual and metaphysical 
questions about normativity. However, Finlay does not clearly distinguish between 
the ordinary notion of a reason and the theoretical one that, we think, is of primary 
interest in normative and metanormative theorizing. Indeed, in recent work he 
explicitly takes accounts of reasons as “answers to (‘why’) questions” to be roughly 
equivalent to accounts of reasons as “grounds/truth-makers” (2019: 62, fn. 1), 
whereas we want to sharply distinguish them. As far as we can see, there is no more 
reason to expect that a correct account of reasons-as-metaphysical-grounds can be 
arrived at through the study of ordinary normative language than there is to expect 
that a correct physical theory of mass and force can be arrived at through the study 
of the ordinary English terms ‘mass’ and ‘force’. Finlay himself does little to motivate 
his language-first methodology, other than to say that the proof is “in the pudding” 
(2014: 14). Since Finlay’s semantic project has been criticized elsewhere (e.g., Fogal 
2016b; Dowell, 2020; Worsnip, 2020), we’ll put Finlay’s alternative methodology to 
the side. Instead, we’ll treat good-explanationism as an account of the theoretical 
notion of a reason, rather than the ordinary language one. 
Two general forms of good-explanationism can be distinguished, which differ on 
what they take the relevant kind of goodness to be. What we’ll call restricted versions 
focus only on forms of goodness that are normatively significant in and of themselves, 
such as moral value, prudential value, and epistemic value. We’ll call these ‘robust’ 




if and only if it explains why the action in question is good in one of these robust 
ways. Unrestricted versions, by contrast, place no such restrictions. Instead, on such a 
view, pretty much any kind of goodness can play the relevant role, as long as it is 
expressible by ‘(is) good’.14 There are various standards relevant, for example, in 
determining whether a given car, knife, or candy bar is good—the goodness of a car 
depends (inter alia) on how well it drives, the goodness of a knife depends (inter alia) 
on how well it cuts, and the goodness of a candy bar depends (inter alia) on how it 
tastes. Similarly, whether an action is good for a certain purpose depends (inter alia) 
on whether it is a means for promoting that purpose. And on unrestricted versions of 
good-explanationism, all these forms of goodness (in addition to the robust ones) can 
be relevant to whether a fact is a reason to perform a certain action. 
Both versions of good-explanationism face problems. The problem with restricted 
views is simple: when an agent’s performing a certain action would be robustly good, 
this fact can itself be a reason to perform the action. This idea is not only intuitively 
plausible, but it also accords well with the various heuristics for identifying 
normative reasons considered earlier (cf. §2). In particular, the fact that performing 
an action would be robustly good seems capable both of counting in favor of doing 
it, thus fulfilling (R1), and of helping explain why we ought (or are permitted) to do 
it, thus fulfilling (R2). However, given that the relevant form of explanation is 
asymmetric, the fact that performing the action would be robustly good cannot 
explain why performing the action would be robustly good. Restricted goodness-
explanationism is thus incompatible with facts about robust goodness themselves 
being reasons.15 
Unrestricted versions of goodness-explanationism can avoid the problem just 
outlined. In addition to the normatively significant, or ‘robust’, ways in which an 
action can be good, there are also many other, not-clearly-normatively-significant 
ways in which it can be good. Hence, even if one grants that no fact explains itself, 
one can still maintain that when performing a certain action would be robustly good, 
this may explain why performing it would be good in some other, not-necessarily-
                                                   
14 The unrestricted version is closer to Finlay’s view, according to which (roughly) reasons 
explain why the relevant action would be good for some contextually salient end (see e.g. 
2014: 145). After all, there seems to be no restrictions on what ends can (in some context or 
other) be contextually salient. 
15 This kind of argument has been used to criticize so-called ‘buck-passing’ analyses of 
goodness (cf. Crisp, 2005). However, as Schroeder (2009) argues, the most plausible buck-
passing analyses of goodness are compatible with thinking that goodness-facts can 
themselves be reasons. This is good news for buck-passers, since it is hard to think of 
independent reasons to deny that goodness-facts can indeed be reasons (independent, that is, 




robust way, and that this suffices for that fact to be a reason.16 One might claim, for 
instance, that when performing an action would be morally good, this fact explains 
why performing it is good for the purposes of doing something morally good (which, we 
may grant, is a form of goodness that is distinct from moral goodness). And on 
unrestricted versions of good-explanationism, when a fact explains that performing 
an action would be good in this latter way, that suffices for it being a reason to 
perform the action. 
However, unrestricted views are too unrestricted, leading to undesirable 
implications. For example, just as performing an action can be good for the purposes 
of doing something morally good, so it can be good for the purposes of doing 
something morally bad. But a fact that explains why performing an action would be 
good for the purposes of doing something morally bad is not thereby a reason to 
perform it—it’s not the sort of thing that actually counts in favor of performing the 
action, or that helps explain why it ought to be performed. Unrestricted good-
explanationism is incompatible with this fact. 
Good-explanationism thus faces a dilemma. On the one hand, if the forms of 
goodness appealed to are robust, then good-explanationism undergenerates reasons. 
This is because the relevant facts of the form [S’s φ-ing would be (robustly) good] can 
plausibly be reasons themselves, which, given that nothing explains itself, is 
incompatible with the restricted form of good-explanationism. On the other hand, if 
any kind of goodness can play the relevant role, then good-explanationism 
overgenerates reasons—it implies, for example, that a fact that explains why φ-ing 
would be good for doing something morally bad is a normative reason to φ.17 
To avoid this dilemma one must strike a balance between the two extremes. That 
is, one needs to formulate a version of good-explanationism that’s more restricted 
than the most unrestricted ones and less restricted than the most restricted ones. As 
far as we can see, however, there’s no reason to think that such a middle-ground view 
would avoid both horns of the dilemma—if anything, such a view would risk being 
impaled on both. 
                                                   
16 This strategy resembles the one endorsed by Finlay (2019: §4.1) who also seeks to 
accommodate the idea that goodness-facts can be reasons by taking them to explain some 
other kind of goodness-fact. 
17 Note that this dilemma doesn’t depend on assumptions about what value bearers are. If one 
thinks that states of affairs can be (robustly or non-robustly) good, for example, then the 
dilemma can be run in terms of facts of the form [the states of affairs in which S performs φ 
would be good], whereas if one thinks that actions can be good, then the dilemma can be run 
in terms of facts of them form [S’s φ-ing would be good], and so on. Thanks to an anonymous 




3.3 Preliminary diagnosis 
While the problems for ought- and good-explanationism may not be decisive, they 
do motivate the search for a better explanationist account. In this subsection, we’ll 
formulate three desiderata a view should satisfy in order to avoid the problems that 
ought- and good-explanationism face. In the subsequent section, we’ll show how our 
favored view—support-explanationism—satisfies all three. 
As noted above, simple ought-explanationism fails to accommodate outweighed 
reasons. Good-explanationism, in contrast, faced no such difficulty. The reason was 
simple: goodness, unlike ought, is gradable. Goodness is also quantity-like, in that it 
makes sense to ask how much goodness (or value) something has. While appealing to 
a gradable and/or quantity-like notion isn’t the only way to accommodate 
outweighed reasons (as Broome’s view illustrates), we do take it to be the most 
natural one. This yields the following desideratum: 
Desideratum #1: Appeal to a gradable and/or quantity-like normative notion 
in one’s analysis of normative reasons. 
Instead of appealing to a gradable and/or quantity-like normative notion, Broome 
accounts for outweighed reasons by appealing to the notion of a weighing 
explanation in his analysis of normative reasons. But as noted above, such an appeal 
is problematic. The second desideratum ensures that we avoid it: 
Desideratum #2: Avoid appealing to the notion of a weighing explanation in 
one’s analysis of normative reasons. 
Good-explanationism satisfies both Desideratum #1 and Desideratum #2, and hence 
fares better than both forms of ought-explanationism. However, as we argued, it faces 
a dilemma: depending on the details, it either yields too few reasons, by denying that 
facts about robust goodness are reasons, or yields too many reasons, by implying that 
anything that explains any kind of goodness-fact is a reason. A view that satisfies 
desideratum #3 avoids this dilemma: 
Desideratum #3: Allow facts about robust forms of goodness to be normative 
reasons without implying that all facts about non-robust forms of goodness 
are reasons. 
Collectively, these desiderata motivate the search for a version of explanationism that 
appeals to a quantity-like normative notion that’s distinct from goodness, thereby 
avoiding the need to appeal to weighing explanations while also allowing for more 
plausible verdicts about whether—and if so which—goodness-facts are normative 





4. Explanationism: The Support-Based View  
The basic idea behind support-explanationism is simple: to be a reason is to provide—
or be a ‘source’ of—normative support, where the ‘weight,’ ‘strength,’ or ‘significance’ of 
a reason is simply a matter of how much support it provides. In this section we’ll 
clarify support-explanationism in numerous respects (§4.1), compare and contrast it 
with Reasons-First (§4.2), and conclude by exploring some of its substantive 
implications (§§4.3-5.2).  
4.1 Clarifying support-explanationism  
Our view can be initially formulated as follows: 
Support-explanationism: For r to be a normative reason for S to φ is for r to 
explain why there is a certain amount of normative support for S’s φ-ing. 
The property of being a normative reason is thus analyzed in terms of the notion of 
normative support together with the notion of explanation. This is compatible with 
there being distinct species of normative support: just as one might want to 
distinguish between moral reasons, epistemic reasons, prudential reasons, and so on, 
so one can distinguish between moral support, epistemic support, prudential 
support, and so on, and in each case analyze the former in terms of the explanation 
of the latter. Like other explanationist views, then, support-explanationism neatly 
secures the connection between reasons and explanation characterized earlier (§1).18 
To illustrate the implications of support-explanationism, return to the possibility 
of outweighed reasons. In the soda case in §3.1, the fact that soda is tasty helps explain 
why there’s a certain amount of support for Nils’ drinking it, and the fact that soda is 
unhealthy helps explain why there’s a certain amount of support for Nils’ not 
drinking it.19 Both facts are reasons (one for and the other against), but the latter is 
‘stronger’ or ‘weightier’ since the amount of support it provides is greater. This 
example also illustrates the fact that normative support is typically pro tanto, in the 
sense that there can be support for actions (such as Nils’s drinking soda) that, all 
things considered, ought not to be performed. We’ll mostly focus on pro tanto 
                                                   
18 Support-explanationism is also compatible with the distinction between ‘objective’ kinds of 
support and other, more ‘subjective’ or ‘perspectival’ kinds of support, akin to the distinction 
between objective (or fact-relative) reasons and other, more subjective (e.g. evidence-relative, 
belief-relative) reasons. For more on the nature and importance of such distinctions, see Fogal 
and Worsnip (forthcoming). 
19 For simplicity, we’re assuming that reasons against φ should be understood as facts that 
provide support for not doing φ. However, another possibility (suggested to us by Selim 
Berker in personal communication) is to understand reasons against φ as facts that provide 
dis-support for doing φ. Support-explanationism is compatible with both these possibilities. 




support in what follows, leaving the ‘pro tanto’ qualifier implicit, though we leave 
open the possibility that some facts count as reasons in virtue of providing decisive 
(rather than merely pro tanto) support.20 
Given the distinctions between ordinary and theoretical uses of ‘reason(s)’ and 
between pragmatic and non-pragmatic notions of explanation (cf. §2), support-
explanationism can be more carefully put as follows: reasons in the ordinary 
normative sense are considerations that help make sense of why (i.e. pragmatically 
explain why) there’s a certain amount of normative support, while reasons in the 
relevant theoretical sense—i.e. the one associated with roles (R1) and (R2) above—are 
facts that help make it the case that (i.e non-pragmatically explain why) there is a certain 
amount of normative support. The theoretical notion of a normative reason is thus 
related to, but not identical to, the ordinary one. We can thus distinguish: 
Support-explanationismO: For r to be a normative reason (in the ordinary 
sense) for S to φ is for r to make sense of why there is a certain amount of (pro 
tanto) normative support for S‘s φ-ing. 
Support-explanationismT: For r to be a normative reason (in the theoretical 
sense) for S to φ is for r to provide a certain amount of (pro tanto) normative 
support for S’s φ-ing. 
As noted above, it is the theoretical notion, and hence support-explanationismT, that 
primarily interests us here. 
In the remainder of this section we’ll further clarify the key terms that figure in 
the analysans: ‘provide’ (§4.1.1), ‘a certain amount of’ (§4.1.2), ‘pro tanto’ (§4.1.3), and 
‘support’ (§4.1.4). We’ll then make clear how support-explanationism satisfies the 
three desiderata outlined earlier (§4.1.5) and highlight three respects in which it is 
metanormatively neutral (§4.1.6). 
4.1.1 Clarifying ‘provide’ 
On our view, reasons in the theoretical sense don’t just play any old role in helping 
make it the case that there is a certain amount of (pro tanto) normative support: as 
we variously put it, they provide, or generate, or are sources of such support. Each of 
these terms is meant to express the same thing: direct full grounding, where grounding 
is a form of metaphysical explanation (cf. §2). For the fact [p] to directly (or immediately) 
ground [q] is, roughly, for [p] to ground [q] without there being any grounds 
‘between’ [p] and [q].21 (We use square brackets for facts, and sometimes for fact 
                                                   
20 Our view is thus compatible with the possibility of there being indefeasible duties (cf. 
Reisner 2018), understood in terms of indefeasible support. 





schemata—context will disambiguate.) This is to be contrasted with indirect (or 
mediate) grounding, which involves additional grounds between what’s grounded 
and what grounds it. As Kit Fine (2012) notes, for instance, the disjunctive fact [p v q] 
is directly grounded in [p] and [q] while facts about cities are (at best) indirectly 
grounded in facts about atoms, and it is the notion of direct or immediate ground that 
thus “provides us with our sense of a ground-theoretic hierarchy” (51). Further, for 
the fact [p] to fully ground [q] is, roughly, for [p] to constitute a full—as opposed to 
merely partial—metaphysical explanation of [q]. [p] fully grounds [p v q], for example, 
but only partially grounds [p & q]—what fully grounds [p & q] is [p] together with [q]. 
Appealing to the general (and generally recognized) distinctions between direct 
and indirect grounding and full and partial grounding allows support-
explanationism—as well as other forms of explanationism—to avoid certain 
counterintuitive consequences. Suppose, for instance, that it seems to Jens that p, and 
that this provides some support for him to believe that p. According to support-
explanationism, [It seems to Jens that p] is thereby a reason for him to believe that p. 
By invoking direct grounding, however, the view avoids implausibly counting all 
further grounds of [It seems to Jens that p], such as facts about his neural state or the 
microphysical facts that ultimately ground that state, as reasons for him to believe p. 
The distinction between full and partial grounding is also important. Suppose, as 
seems plausible, that it is the fact that Candice sees smoke together with the fact that 
smoke is a sign of fire that provides support for her believing that there’s a fire. By 
invoking full grounding, support-explanationism avoids counting [Candice sees 
smoke] and [Smoke is a sign of fire] as separate reasons, and hence avoids the sorts 
of ‘double-counting’ worries raised earlier (see §2). 
However, understanding the provision of normative support in terms of full, 
direct metaphysical explanation might still be too coarse-grained. That’s because 
there may be different roles for facts to play in the full, direct metaphysical 
explanation of other facts, similar to how there might be different roles for events to 
play in the full, direct causal explanation of other events. In the case of causal 
explanation, for example, one might want to distinguish causes (understood as causal 
‘producers’) from mere background conditions, and distinguish both from the laws 
that govern causal relations between events. Yet all three might have distinctive roles 
to play in the full, direct causal explanation of an event. Similarly, we might want to 
distinguish grounds (understood as metaphysical ‘producers’) from mere 
background conditions, and distinguish both from the metaphysical laws that govern 
grounding relations between facts. All three might have distinctive roles to play in 
the full, direct metaphysical explanation of a given fact.22 In normative theorizing, for 
                                                   
22  On the role of laws in metaphysical explanations, see Glazier (2016), Schaffer (2017), and 




example, it’s common to distinguish between reasons and various background 
conditions, including so-called ‘enablers’ and ‘disablers’ (cf. Dancy, 2004: ch. 3; Bader, 
2016). To illustrate, as noted above (§2), many philosophers deny that the fact that the 
subject can φ is itself a reason—or part of a reason—for them to φ, and instead insist 
that such facts merely enable other facts to be reasons. Support-explanationism can 
accommodate these nuances: enablers and disablers can play their characteristic roles 
and hence be part of the full (non-pragmatic or metaphysical) explanation of why 
there is a certain amount of normative support for φ-ing, but insofar as they aren’t 
themselves providers or sources of that support, they won’t be reasons to φ in the 
relevant sense. The same goes for so-called ‘intensifiers’ and ‘attenuators’, if such 
there be: these will be facts that increase (intensifiers) or decrease (attenuators) the 
amount of normative support generated by other facts (i.e. reasons) without 
themselves being sources of support—they modify existing amounts of support 
without generating it on their own.  
In general, however, we needn’t take a stand on the exact nature or utility—or 
even the intelligibility—of the various (extra-)fine-grained distinctions introduced so 
far. We view them as intramural matters, and hence something our account is 
intended to be neutral with respect to. 
4.1.2 Clarifying ‘a certain amount of’ 
Turning to the locution ‘a certain amount of’ in the official formulation of support-
explanationism, the basic idea is that for r to be a reason of a certain ‘strength’ or 
‘weight’ is for r to provide a corresponding amount of normative support. Thus, 
strong reasons provide a lot of support, weak reasons provide little support, and so 
on. Generalizing, we can formulate a version of the support-explanationism that tells 
us what it is for a reason to have a certain strength: 
Support-explanationismT*: For r to be a normative reason of strength d for S 
to φ is for r to provide d amount of (pro tanto) normative support for S’s φ-
ing. 
This analysis plausibly entails the more generic analysis of reasons above (i.e., 
support-explanationismT), given that r is a reason if and only if r is a reason of some 
strength or other.23 
                                                   
23 There are of course further questions about how to understand amounts of support (e.g. 
whether they should be thought of as genuine abstract entities), corresponding to questions 
about how to understand lengths, heights, values, and any other magnitude. Support-
explanationism is compatible with different views about these general issues. See Bykvist 




4.1.3 Clarifying ‘pro tanto’ 
The main point regarding the ‘pro tanto’ qualifier in support-explanationism is that 
the relevant notion of support is (at least in general) defeasible. There are two main 
forms of defeat, both of which admit of degrees: opposition (or rebutting) and 
undermining (or attenuation). To illustrate, suppose that Andreas, a trusted friend, 
tells us that p, thereby providing some support for believing that p. If Mira, another 
trusted friend, testifies that p is false, then that provides support that opposes our 
support for believing p. Were she instead (or in addition) to testify that Andreas is a 
liar, then that would undermine the support for believing p that his testimony 
provides (at least to some degree).24 
If one accepts the (extra-)fine-grained distinctions introduced above (§4.1.1), we 
can further clarify the notion of pro tanto support by distinguishing the following 
four ‘levels’ in explanations of particular facts about what we ought or are permitted 
to do:25 
(1) the underlying level: facts (often non-normative ones) that provide support for 
and against the relevant actions or attitudes available to a given agent in a 
given situation; 
(2) the initial normative level: facts about how much support the facts on the 
underlying level provide, prior to being modified by modifiers, such as 
intensifiers, underminers, and so on (if such there be); 
(3) the modified normative level: facts about how the support generated on the initial 
normative level is modified by modifiers (if such there be); 
(4) the overall normative level: facts about which actions/attitudes the relevant 
agent ought or may perform/have, and which obtain in virtue of the facts 
about modified support at the third level.26 
Given this quadripartite picture, the question arises how we should understand the 
various ‘pro tanto’-notions that have been invoked in the literature (pro tanto reasons, 
                                                   
24 As Pryor (2013: 90) notes, although “[m]ost of us discern an intuitive kind” when 
considering such examples of epistemic undermining, “it’s difficult to say in a rigorous way 
what makes it distinctive”. See Pryor (2013: §2) for some possible complications. 
25 This picture is not meant to be exhaustive; among other things, it ignores the fact that 
general normative principles (or ‘laws’) concerning support may (and we ourselves think do) 
also play a role in fully explaining particular facts about support, similar to how causal laws 
arguably play a role in fully explaining the occurrence of particular events (see §4.1.1). For 
articulation and defense of the general principle-based account of normative explanation, see 
Fogal and Risberg (2020). 
26 We’re here drawing and expanding on Berker (2007: 116), who presents a three-level model 
for moral explanations (rather than for normative explanations more generally). Berker does 
not distinguish between what we call the initial and the modified normative levels; his model 




pro tanto duties, etc.). For instance, does the amount of support generated by a pro 
tanto reason correspond to the amount of support provided at the initial normative 
level or the modified normative level? We think there’s no need to choose: there are 
simply two useful notions of a pro tanto reason (and more generally, two useful 
groups of pro tanto notions), corresponding to the second and the third level, 
respectively. What we may call initial or unmodified support is the support that 
modifiers modify, and which is determined on the second (initial) level, whereas 
what we may call modified support is the support that results once the modifiers have 
modified the initial support, and which is thus determined on the third (modified) 
level. Given support-explanationism, we can thus say that r is an initial reason just in 
case r provides initial support, and r is a modified reason just in case r provides 
modified support. 
In many cases, one and the same fact will be both an initial and a modified reason. 
However, one way that the initial and modified notions of a reason might come apart 
is in cases where a reason is attenuated or undermined entirely (reduced to zero, as 
it were).27 Suppose again that Andreas testifies that p, thereby providing some initial 
support for us to believe that p. Suppose further, however, that we subsequently learn 
that Andreas is no more reliable than a coin flip. This clearly undermines the support 
provided by his testimony—so much so (let’s suppose) that it is eliminated entirely.28 
Does the fact that Andreas testifies that p still count as a reason for us to believe that 
p? Support-explanationism is compatible with different answers depending on the 
notion of support one chooses to invoke, but we think the best answer is: in one sense 
yes, in another sense no. It’s a reason in the initial sense because it provides initial 
support, but not in the modified sense because it fails to provide modified support. 
4.1.4 Clarifying ‘support’ 
The fourth and final point of clarification concerns the locution ‘support’ that 
support-explanationism invokes. Here it’s crucial to distinguish between the verb ‘(to) 
support’ and the mass noun ‘support’ (each in their normative senses). The verb is 
very closely related to the count noun ‘reason(s)’ in its normative sense—indeed, we 
take the claim that r is a normative reason to φ to be essentially equivalent to the claim 
that r normatively supports φ-ing. All parties can, should, and often do accept this 
much. Indeed, even Reasons-Firsters—who reject explanationism about reasons—
                                                   
27 Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging us to address this kind of case. (A similar set of 
issues arises with respect to disabled reasons as well.) 
28 We ourselves actually doubt this is a case of complete elimination—like Schroeder (2007: 




often claim that being a reason to φ is basically equivalent to ‘favoring’ or ‘counting 
in favor’ of φ-ing, where the latter is basically equivalent to supporting φ-ing.29 
Can something informative be said, then, about what it is for r to normatively 
support (verb) φ-ing? According to Reasons-First, the answer is ‘no’. According to 
support-explanationism, however, the answer is ‘yes’: for r to normatively support 
φ-ing is for r to provide—or be a source of—normative support for φ-ing, where ‘support’ 
in its latter occurrence is a mass noun, not a verb. According to support-
explanationism, then, what it is to normatively support (verb) something is analyzed 
in terms of normative support (mass noun) together with the relevant notion of 
metaphysical explanation, in much the same way that normative reasons are. (This is 
unsurprising, since, again, being a normative reason to φ is essentially equivalent to 
supporting φ.) So whereas a verb-based version of support-explanationism risks 
being a notational variant of Reasons-First, the mass noun-based view—which we 
endorse—is not. To insist otherwise would be to collapse the distinction, noted at the 
                                                   
29 We focus on ‘support’ rather than ‘count(s) in favor’ or ‘favor(s)’—both of which are 
similarly intimately related to reasons but not similarly used as mass nouns—because 
‘support’ is more expressively adequate in at least three ways. First,  as a verb it expresses 
more-or-less the same thing as ‘count(s) in favor of’ and ‘favor(s)’ while avoiding some of the 
idiosyncrasies of both—like ‘favor(s)’ and unlike ‘count(s) in favor’, it naturally allows for 
passive constructions (compare ‘φ-ing is supported/favored (by r)’ to #‘φ-ing is counted in 
favor of (by r)’), and like ‘count(s) in favor’ but unlike ‘favor(s)’, it allows for a clear(er) non-
contrastive reading—in a sentence such as ‘r favors φ-ing’, it is natural to hear an implicit 
contrast: ‘r favors φ-ing rather than ψ-ing’. Although reasons and support may ultimately be 
contrastive (though we ourselves doubt  it), that’s a substantive issue, and so not something 
we should build into our terminology from the outset (see further Snedegar, 2017). Secondly, 
although all three terms can be used in ways that reflect the fundamentally gradable, quantity-
like nature of the underlying normative phenomenon—e.g. we can ask, ‘How much does r 
support/favor/count in favor of φ-ing?’ and answer by saying things like, ‘r strongly 
supports/favors/counts in favor of φ-ing’—‘support’, given its use as both a verb and mass 
noun, is the most flexible and systematic—for instance, we can answer the preceding question 
by quantifying or otherwise qualifying the amount of support (mass noun) rather than just 
qualifying the relation of support (verb). Lastly, although ‘reason(s)’, ‘favor(s)’, and ‘count(s) 
in favor’ are related in English, the latter two expressions appear to be somewhat idiosyncratic 
to English. In Swedish, for instance, there are no straightforward translations of ‘favor(s)’ or 
‘count(s) in favor’; the expression closest to ‘count(s) in favor’ is ‘talar för’ (literally ‘speaks 
for’), and there is no expression that’s particularly close to ‘favor(s)’. Yet Swedish, and the 
Swedish term for ‘reason’ (’skäl’) in particular, resembles English in many other relevant 
ways: (a) ‘skäl’ can be used both as a mass and a count noun; (b) ‘skäl’ is connected to a mass 
noun/verb-pair that translates to ‘support’/’supports’ (‘stöd’/’stödjer’); (c) ‘skäl’ and ‘reason’ 
are connected to explanation in the same way, with ‘skäl’ also having motivating and merely 
explanatory uses, causal as well as metaphysical ones, and so on; and (d) ‘skäl’ and ‘stöd’ both 
naturally combine with a locution corresponding to ‘provides’ (‘ger skäl’ and ‘ger stöd’; 
literally ‘gives reason’ and ‘gives support’). This provides some limited but suggestive cross-
linguistic support for taking ‘support’ to be more reflective of the underlying phenomenon 
than ‘count(s) in favor’ and ‘favor(s)’. Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting us to 




outset, between being a source or provider of something (in this case, being a reason) 
with that which it is a source or provider of (in this case, normative support). 
Although ‘normative support’ is a theoretical term, what it denotes is familiar. In 
ordinary thought and talk, the notion of normative support is commonly expressed 
by the mass noun ‘reason’ (as well as, of course, ‘support’). To say that there is reason 
(mass noun) to φ is essentially the same as saying that there is normative support for 
φ-ing, and hence that φ-ing is, at least to some degree, worth doing or having. More 
colloquially, it’s just to say that there is something (though not necessarily some thing) 
to be said in favor of φ-ing. Support-explanationism could thus alternatively be called 
‘reason-explanationism’, and be expressed in slogan form as follows: to be a reason 
is to provide reason (i.e., support). Indeed, this view parallels the account of the 
semantic relation between the mass noun ‘reason’ and count noun ‘reason(s)’ (in its 
normative sense) provided by Fogal (2016a), drawing on work in lexical semantics on 
the mass-count distinction. There are nonetheless important differences both in 
focus—Fogal focuses on ‘reason(s)’ in the ordinary sense whereas we focus on the 
theoretical sense—and in methodology—Fogal’s arguments are primarily linguistic 
in nature whereas ours are not. The present point is just that support-explanationism 
sits well with an independently-motivated linguistic view about the relationship 
between mass and count noun uses of ‘reason’ in its ordinary normative sense. That 
said, for the sake of clarity of contrast with reasons, we prefer the quasi-theoretical 
term ‘(normative) support’. 
We should note, however, that the term ‘support’ is polysemous, and while some 
uses of it pattern like ‘(normative) support’, with the verb plausibly being analyzable 
in terms of the mass noun, others might not. Consider, for example, the financial sense 
of ‘support’. Here too the verbal form ‘to (financially) support’ is plausibly analyzed 
in terms of the mass noun ‘(financial) support’: for A to financially support B is for A 
to provide, or be a source of, financial support to B, and being a source of financial 
support (e.g. being a parent or investor) is clearly different from the support that is 
provided (e.g. money). This contrasts with the sense of ‘support’ invoked when 
talking about sports allegiances, such as when we say that Elton John supports 
Watford F.C. Here the verb ‘(to) support’ is not naturally analyzed in terms of the 
mass noun ‘support’: for S to support some team T is not intuitively a matter of S 
providing some kind of support to T. Indeed, talk of a fan ‘providing support’ to a 
sports team sounds odd, unless it means something like financial or emotional 
support, neither of which is usually the case. More generally, with notions of support 
where the verbal form is basic, talk of ‘providing’ support is usually stilted or 




further supports taking the mass noun ‘(normative) support’ to be prior to the verb 
‘to (normatively) support’.30 
Although the analysis of reasons in terms of support is meant to be informative, 
it is not meant to be revolutionary. Many other—and clearly correct—analyses are 
similar in this respect. What is it, for example, to be a beer (count noun)? The obvious 
answer is: to be a beer is to be a (conventional) unit or serving of beer (mass noun). 
What is it to financially support (verb) someone? It’s to provide them with financial 
support (mass noun), such as money. What is it to be a cook? It’s to be someone who 
prepares food for consumption. And so on. While such analyses might seem almost 
trivially true, that’s not a reason to reject them—on the contrary, their obviousness 
indicates that they are true, not that they are false. Complaining that such analyses 
are uninformative is similarly misguided, since they clearly are informative. The 
analysis of being a beer (count noun) in terms of being a conventional unit or serving 
of beer (mass noun), for example, reveals the priority of the (denotation of the) mass 
noun over the (denotation of the) count noun. It also reveals a point of commonality 
with certain other count-mass pairs—a coffee, for example, is a (conventional) unit or 
                                                   
30 This isn’t to say that all uses of ‘support’ that pattern like ‘(normative) support’ in some ways 
also pattern like it in all ways. There do tend to be other commonalities, however. For example, 
in cases where talk of ‘providing support’ is natural, talk of ‘explaining why there is support’ 
is also usually natural. If someone’s parents provide them with financial support, then their 
parents (or  facts about them) help explain why they have a corresponding amount of financial 
support, and when a group of senators provide support for a gun safety bill, they (or facts 
about them) help explain why there is a certain amount of political support for the bill. (We 
owe these examples to Selim Berker (personal communication), though they were originally 
offered as counterexamples.) But of course there are limits to the similarities between different 
uses of ‘support’—they are different uses after all—and this is especially true of semi-technical 
uses of ‘support’, like ours. Political support is particularly notable, since it’s a case where 
‘provision’-talk is apt even though the verb is not naturally analyzed in terms of the mass 
noun. Consider the sentence, ‘There was some support for the gun safety bill in the Senate, 
but ultimately it was defeated by a vote of 55 to 45’. As Selim Berker points out (in personal 
communication), if we ask what explains why there was some support for the bill in the 
Senate, one answer is ‘Because Senator #1 supported it (by voting for it)’, another answer is 
‘Because Senator #2 supported it (by voting for it)’, and so on. Here facts involving the relation 
denoted by the verb seem to explain facts about the quantity or amount denoted by the mass 
noun. While it might be thought that the same is true of normative support, we (of course) 
doubt it. That’s because there are important disanalogies between normative support and 
political support in the sense at issue: whereas a fact can support φ-ing to a certain degree, or 
to a greater degree than another fact supports φ-ing, or to a greater degree than it supports ψ-
ing, parallel claims aren’t true of political support: either a senator supports a bill by voting 
for it or they don’t. Similarly, if there’s more political support for a bill in the Senate, then 
there are more supporters for the bill, but if there's more normative support for φ than for ψ, 
that doesn’t entail that there are more reasons to φ (for instance, a strong reason to φ might 
outweigh two weak reasons to ψ). A modified version of the verb-based view of normative 
support might nevertheless be viable—one that includes an argument place for degrees. We 




serving of coffee. Such analyses also have informative implications: for instance, if 
someone has an alternative view of beers—perhaps they endorse a competing 
analysis, or take the notion of a beer to be unanalyzable (cf. ‘Beers-First’)—the 
analysis offered can reveal that they’re mistaken. Of course, the analysis of beers in 
terms of (conventional units or servings of) beer will only be informative to someone 
who already understands the analysandum—and in particular what beer is—but this 
is true of analyses in general. 
All the points just made apply to support-explanationism as well. If the analysis 
of reasons in terms of the provision of normative support (or reason) seems to border 
on the trivial, this is a reason to accept the analysis, not to reject it. What’s more, the 
analysis is both informative in its own right—among other things, it reveals that 
normative reasons, just like motivating and explanatory reasons, can be understood 
partly in terms of explanation—and has informative implications—it reveals, among 
other things, that competing analyses of reasons should be rejected. (We’ll consider a 
number of further substantive implications of the analysis below.) Of course, if one 
has trouble grasping the notions that figure in the analysandum—whether it be 
normative support or the relevant notion of explanation or both—then one will not 
understand support-explanationism either. But again, this is true of any analysis 
whatsoever, including analyses of normative reasons such as good-explanationism 
and ought-explanationism. 
Terminological care with regards to ‘support’, ‘reason’, ‘reason(s)’, ‘provides’, 
and related terms is called for not only because it helps make sense of their 
relationship to each other, but also because terminological carelessness can lead to 
confusion. Consider, for example, T. M. Scanlon’s influential characterization of a 
reason: 
I will take the idea of a reason as primitive. Any attempt to explain what it is to 
be a reason for something seems to me to lead back to the same idea: a 
consideration that counts in favor of it. ‘Counts in favor how?’ one might ask. 
‘By providing a reason for it’ seems to be the only answer. (Scanlon, 1998: 17) 
Taken literally, this seems to entail that for something to be a reason is for it to provide 
a reason. To be a reason is thus to be something that provides something that provides 
something that… ad infinitum. That’s worse than uninformative. 
Of course, the literal reading might be uncharitable. Maybe Scanlon just meant 
that the only answer to his question is ‘by being a reason for it’, or maybe he 
intentionally ignored such subtleties. Note, though, that there is another way to 
naturally adjust his formulation—instead of changing ‘providing’ to ‘being’, we 




Scanlon’s question would then be ‘by providing reason (i.e. support) for it’, which is 
precisely the answer that support-explanationism predicts. 
Similar issues arise with Derek Parfit’s explanation of why the notion of a reason 
is “indefinable”. Parfit writes: 
[I]t is hard to explain the concept of a reason, or what the phrase ‘a reason’ 
means. Facts give us reasons, we might say, when they count in favour of our 
having some attitude, or our acting in some way. But ‘counts in favour of’ 
means roughly ‘gives a reason for’. (Parfit, 2011: 31) 
While this indicates why one might think that the notion of giving a reason is 
indefinable, it doesn’t shed much light on what it is to be a reason (i.e. what it is that 
is ‘given’) or why it might be indefinable—unless one assumes that to be a reason is 
to give a reason, which again raises the spectre of regress.31 
4.1.5 Satisfying the three desiderata 
It should now be clear how support-explanationism satisfies the three desiderata 
presented in §3.3: 
Desideratum #1: Appeal to a gradable and/or quantity-like normative notion 
in one’s analysis of what it is to be a normative reason. 
Desideratum #2: Avoid appealing the notion of a weighing explanation in 
one’s analysis of what it is to be a normative reason. 
Desideratum #3: Allow facts about robust forms of goodness to be normative 
reasons without implying that all facts about non-robust forms of goodness 
are reasons. 
The notion of support is gradable and quantity-like (Desideratum #1), the view 
doesn’t invoke the notion of a weighing explanation (Desideratum #2), and it allows 
that when an action is morally good, that fact provides some support for performing 
it, without also implying that when an action is non-robustly good (e.g. good for the 
purposes of doing something morally bad), that fact provides some support for 
performing it (Desideratum #3). 
                                                   
31 Interestingly, Broome (2021) presents an interpretation according to which Parfit’s usage of 
the phrase ‘gives a reason’ reveals that Parfit’s concept of a reason “differs from most 
philosophers’” (Broome, 2021: 299). This would be important (and surprising) if true, but as 
Broome himself acknowledges, there are good reasons to reject his interpretation (see Broome, 




4.1.6 Theoretical neutrality 
A final point of clarification concerns the ecumenical nature of support-
explanationism. There are at least three important respects in which it is 
metanormatively neutral. 
First, unlike ought-explanationism and good-explanationism, support-
explanationism is neutral with respect to the relative priority of reasons vis-à-vis both 
deontic and evaluative facts. Whereas ought-explanationism analyzes reasons in 
terms of the paradigmatic deontic notion—namely, ought—good-explanationism 
analyzes them in terms of the paradigmatic evaluative notion—namely, goodness. 
Each takes a substantive stand, then, on the relative priority of the deontic and/or 
evaluative over reasons. By contrast, support-explanationism avoids such a 
commitment: it analyzes reasons in terms of a notion—normative support—that 
clearly belongs to the same category of normative notions as that of a reason, and is 
neither uncontroversially evaluative nor uncontroversially deontic (cf. Berker, ms). 
Everyone should agree that reasons and support are in the same normative category, 
and that's all our view is committed to.32 
Second, support-explanationism is compatible with—but doesn’t entail—
pluralism concerning the grounds of support, according to which support-facts in 
different domains obtain in virtue of other (normative or non-normative) facts, which 
needn’t be the same across domains, or even within a single domain. This is an issue 
to be settled by substantive first-order theorizing, which support-explanationism is 
neutral with respect to. Nonetheless, to illustrate, facts about support might obtain in 
virtue of facts about value in the objective practical realm (cf. Oddie & Menzies, 1992), 
expected choiceworthiness in the realm of substantive practical rationality (cf. 
Wedgwood, 2017; MacAskill & Ord, 2020), epistemic justification in the realm of 
substantive theoretical rationality (cf. Pryor, 2005), and attitudinal pressure in the 
realm of structural rationality (both practical and theoretical) (cf. Fogal, 2020). Each 
of these dimensions of evaluation can be said to correspond to a distinctive kind of 
pro tanto normative support, with few (if any) being reducible to the others, and in 
each case actions and attitudes can be ranked higher or lower, or better or worse, 
along that dimension, with the ranking being determined by how much normative 
support the relevant actions or attitudes enjoy. 
Finally, support-explanationism is silent as to whether normative support can be 
analyzed in non-normative or naturalistic terms, and hence on whether a form of 
                                                   
32 The analysis of reasons in terms of support is thus neutral on whether support can be 
analyzed in terms of some other normative notion, such as value—it only rules out that 
support can be analyzed in terms of the notion of a reason (count noun), since that would be 
circular. Analyzing support in terms of value is nonetheless likely to face problems, including 




metanormative reductionism or naturalism about support (and so, given support-
explanationism, also about normative reasons) is true. This, too, is a debate to be 
settled elsewhere. 
4.2 Support-Explanationism vs. Reasons-First 
Although we have already highlighted a number of differences between support-
explanationism and Reasons-First, the reader might wonder what more might be said 
to motivate one over the other. Hence, in this subsection we’ll highlight three further 
important differences and their consequences, before exploring three additional 
substantive implications of our view (§§4.3–5.2).  
The first additional difference concerns the structure of the normatively 
fundamental facts. According to Reasons-First, those facts are what we earlier called 
‘reasons-facts—i.e., facts of the form [r is a reason for S to φ]. These facts involve at 
least three relata: (i) the fact, r, that is the reason, (ii), the subject, S, and (iii) the action, 
φ, that r is a reason to perform.33 On support-explanationism, however, support-
facts—i.e., facts of the form [There is (a certain amount of) support for S’s φ-ing], in 
which r is not a relatum—are more fundamental than reasons-facts. Although 
support-facts obtain (at least in part) in virtue of the fact that is the reason—i.e. r—
they do not obtain in virtue of reasons-facts themselves. Given that disputes about 
relative fundamentality are substantive (and that facts with different constituents 
cannot be identical), the conflict between support-explanationism and Reasons-First 
is equally substantive. 
All of this is relevant when evaluating one of the main contemporary sources of 
support for Reasons-First, which is that normative reasons are intuitively more 
fundamental than many other normative facts, such as facts about what we ought to 
do. This consideration is accommodated equally well, if not more so, by support-
explanationism. The distinction between the fact, r, that is the reason, and the fact that 
r is a reason is crucial here. On support-explanationism, the facts that are normative 
reasons—i.e. the facts corresponding to r in reasons-facts of the form [r is a reason for 
S to φ], and that belong to the ‘underlying level’ discussed in §4.1.3—are simply the 
facts that help explain (in a distinctive way) why various actions or attitudes are 
supported to certain degrees, and thus help explain why certain actions ought to be 
performed or or attitudes ought to be had. However, those facts don’t play the 
relevant explanatory role because they are normative reasons—instead, they are 
normative reasons because they play that explanatory role. For example, suppose 
there is (a certain amount of) support for giving your partner a gift because doing so 
would make them happy. It is the latter, non-normative fact about your partner’s 
                                                   
33 Further argument places can also be added; for instance, Scanlon (2014) includes an 




happiness that explains the fact about normative support. The fact that there’s 
support for giving your partner a gift is not explained by the fact that the fact that [sic] 
the action would make them happy is a reason to perform it. On the contrary, rather 
than playing an explanatory role, the reasons-fact—i.e. the fact that the action would 
make your partner happy is a reason to perform it—is itself explained: it obtains in virtue 
of the non-normative fact providing support for the relevant action. This point 
generalizes: reasons-facts obtain in virtue of facts about support, while particular 
facts about support obtain in virtue of the facts that are reasons. Although this 
vindicates the idea that reasons (that is: the facts that are reasons) are intuitively more 
fundamental than many normative facts, such as facts about what we ought to do, 
the relationship between reasons-facts and ought-facts is less straightforward. That’s 
because neither reasons-facts nor ought-facts obtain in virtue of the other—instead, 
both obtain in virtue of support-facts. Support-facts are thus a ‘common cause’ (or, as 
it were, a ‘common ground’) of both reasons-facts and ought-facts. 
A second notable difference between support-explanationism and Reason-First is 
that Reasons-First is like ought-explanationism (and unlike support-explanationism) 
in appealing to a non-gradable primitive: something can’t be more of a reason than 
something else. A reason can be stronger or weightier than another, but that doesn’t 
make it more of a reason—it just means that the normative support it provides is 
greater. This is notable since another feature of Reasons-First that has often been 
taken to be attractive is that it, unlike (e.g.) ought-explanationism, involves a 
normative primitive that is pro tanto and ‘contributory’. For example, what Mark 
Schroeder (forthcoming) calls the ‘classical argument’ for Reasons-First focuses on 
the idea that “[in] every case, what you ought to do (all-things-considered, as Ross 
put it) is a matter of the competition between different factors […] Ross called these 
competing moral forces prima facie duties, and later theorists have called them reasons” 
(6). We take it that reasons are more naturally thought of as things that exert ‘moral 
force’, not things that are forces. But there are two other things that we want to 
emphasize. First, the classical argument for Reasons-First isn’t really an argument for 
taking the reasons-relation to be ‘first’, as opposed to some other contributory notion 
(or notions, for that matter). Support-explanationism, in particular, fits well with 
Schroeder’s Rossian analogy, with the competing forces that determine what we 
ought to do being understood as competing amounts of normative support. Second, 
absent a plausible Reasons-First-friendly account of how a reason’s ‘strength’ or 
‘weight’ should be understood, the Rossian analogy actually speaks against, rather 
than in favor of, Reasons-First. For if the analogy is correct, and competing normative 
forces determine what we ought to do, then the relative strengths of those forces 
clearly play an important role in that determination. 
The importance of giving an account of the weight of reasons is also illustrated 




has often been taken to support Reasons-First (e.g., Schroeder, 2018: 289–290). Given 
the close connection between support and reason (mass noun), support-
explanationism makes perfect sense of this slogan: it simply expresses the idea that 
you ought to do what there is most support for doing. Without an account of the 
weight of reasons (and thus of what there is most reason to do), by contrast, Reasons-
First actually struggles to make good sense of it. This is another putative source of 
support for Reasons-First that support-explanationism accommodates at least as well, 
if not more so. 
Whether Reasons-First is plausible thus depends on whether the gradable notion 
of the strength or weight of a reason can be convincingly incorporated into the 
framework. We ourselves doubt it: not many Reasons-Firsters have tried to provide 
a theory of weight, and the proposals that exist are problematic. Though we won’t 
consider the proposals in detail here, we’ll briefly outline some concerns about them. 
The first and most natural way to account for weight within the Reasons-First 
framework is simply to take the reasons-relation to include an argument-place for the 
weight of the reason, or the degree of support that it provides (cf. Skorupski, 2010: 
ch. 2). On this modified view, reasons-facts are of the form [r is a reason of weight w 
to φ], or [r is a reason that supports φ-ing to degree d]. However, as this modification 
makes clear, such facts involve two ingredients: (i) the degree to which φ-ing is 
normatively supported (or: the amount of the normative ‘weight’ that the reason has), 
and (ii) the fact, r, that provides this support. This is evidence that that reasons-facts 
are not normatively fundamental, contrary to what this version of Reasons-First 
entails, and can instead be further analyzed in terms of these ingredients—just as 
support-explanationism predicts. For according to support-explanationism, for r to 
be a reason that supports φ-ing to a certain degree, d, just is for r to provide a 
corresponding amount of support, d, for φ-ing, and in that sense explain why it 
obtains. The amount of normative support provided by a fact is not a relatum in a 
normatively fundamental reasons-relation, but instead a more fundamental 
normative feature in terms of which the reasons-relation should be understood. Thus, 
the most natural way to account for weight within the Reasons-First view actually 
points away from Reasons-First, and towards support-explanationism instead. 
It is notable that, perhaps because of this worry, several prominent Reasons-
Firsters instead seek to analyze the weight of reasons in terms of yet more facts about 
reasons. The most well-known example of this strategy is due to Schroeder (2007), 
who analyzes the weight of reasons in terms of further reasons to ‘place weight’ on 
those reasons in deliberation. This has not been a popular view. For not only is it 
subject to apparent counter-examples (see e.g. Risberg, 2016), it is also highly counter-
intuitive, at least once psychological and normative senses of ‘(placing) weight’ are 
clearly distinguished. What Schroeder’s strategy illustrates, however, is the pressure 




themselves—for otherwise it is difficult to maintain the idea that reasons are 
normatively ‘first’.34 And until such an account has been provided, it is also difficult 
to accommodate various putatively platitudinous sources of support for Reasons-
First, such as Schroeder’s Rossian analogy and the slogan that ‘you ought to do what 
you have most reason to do’. As noted above, these are considerations that support-
explanationism accommodates with ease. 
A third important difference between Reasons-First and support-explanationism 
is that the latter view does not entail an ambitious ‘Support-First’ approach, 
according to which every other normative notion—goodness, rightness, virtue, etc.—
can ultimately be explained in terms of normative support. While such an approach 
would be more plausible than Reasons-First (in part for the reasons mentioned 
above), it would face versions of the many familiar problems for imperialistic 
reductionist programs.35 Instead, support-explanationism only entails that the notion 
of normative support is prior to the notion of a normative reason, and as a result, that 
reasons-facts are not normatively first. This is compatible with thinking that there are 
other normative notions that are at least as fundamental as that of support. 
4.3 Force vs. Weight 
A further advantage of analyzing reasons in terms of support is that doing so avoids 
some of the limitations of the simple weight/weighing metaphor highlighted in §3.1. 
Our view instead suggests a more productive metaphor, one which appears in 
Schroeder’s presentation of the ‘classical argument’ above: that of force. Like forces in 
general, normative support has something akin to magnitude (which can vary) and 
direction (for/against), and we can usefully distinguish between component and 
resultant support on analogy with component and resultant forces. All of this helps 
make straightforward sense of various force-like notions employed by normative 
theorists, including not just support but also opposition and undermining, which are 
                                                   
34 Another Reasons-First-friendly account of weight is proposed by Scanlon (2014), who 
analyzes weight in counterfactual terms. His view is threatened by the same problems that 
plague counterfactual analyses in general (cf. Shope, 1979), and he provides no reason to think 
that his view avoids them (for further criticism of Scanlon’s view, see Schroeder (2015)). The 
notion of a reason’s weight also plays a crucial role in Lord’s (2018) defense of Reasons-First, 
but he says little about how it should be understood. Lord says he finds “mysterious” the idea 
of what he calls atomic weight, which is “the weight that a reason has independently of how 
it interacts with the other reasons in a particular situation” (2018: 193–194). He also invokes a 
view of intensifiers and attenuators of weight that resembles Schroeder’s view, on which they 
are understood as reasons to place more or less weight on certain reasons (2018: 33). 
35 For example, an analysis of value in terms of supported pro-attitudes would face a version 
of the well-known ‘wrong kind of reason(s)’-problem (cf. Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen, 
2004). Moreover, as Wodak (2020a) argues, it’s not clear why we should expect any normative 





the two main ways in which support is defeasible (cf. §4.1.3). The force metaphor 
allows for different ways of understanding the nature of such interactions, as well as 
the possibility that they are non-monotonic and non-additive. In cases involving 
opposition, for instance, we can think of the initial component normative force (i.e. 
pro tanto support) as remaining constant even though the overall resultant force (i.e. 
net support) is altered by competing component forces, whereas in cases involving 
undermining we can think of the initial component force as itself being weakened 
(and, at the limit, eliminated), with the resultant force changing as a result. Hence, 
even if the resultant force (or net support) ends up being the same in both cases, the 
explanation of why each ends up that way differs, which allows one to 
straightforwardly distinguish opposition and undermining. Similar things can be 
said about other ways in which the strength or significance of a reason may be altered, 
such as by being ‘intensified’. 
Support-explanationism thus provides a ready answer to a question posed by 
Hawthorne and Magidor, concerning whether “there are more subtle ways to expand 
the explanation[ist] view” in a way that goes beyond the simple model of weights 
and weighing (2018: 134). They don’t themselves provide a positive view, but they do 
highlight some important work that might serve as inspiration. In particular, they 
mention work in the philosophy of science on modeling causal forces (and their 
interactions), as well as work in epistemology that employs inference graphs (e.g., 
Pollock, 1995; Berker, 2015), where such graphs “encode directed patterns and 
strength of support between ‘prima facie’ reasons and various propositions as well 
as phenomena of defeat (nodes on inference graphs get marked as defeated or 
undefeated)” (Hawthorne & Magidor, 2018: 134). Both of these literatures hold 
promise when it comes to modeling relations of normative support—indeed, the 
epistemological literature making use of inference graphs in modeling relations of 
epistemic support can be seen as a special case of the more general project of 
modeling relations of normative support of all kinds. 
5. Support-explanationism: Two applications 
Before concluding, we’ll consider the implications of our view for two additional 
issues in metanormativity: the question of whether Reasons-First should be especially 
attractive to adherents of ‘non-naturalism’ about normativity (answer: no), and the 
question of whether explanationist views can accommodate what Daniel Wodak 
(2020b) calls ‘redundant reasons’ (answer: yes).  
5.1 Support-explanationism, Reasons-First, and non-naturalism 
Understanding reasons-facts as facts about explanations of normative support allows 
us to account for an observation made by Selim Berker (2019) about a way in which 




reasons-facts don’t always obviously cry out for ‘grounding explanations’ by 
reference to natural (or descriptive or whatever) facts. If this is correct, reasons-facts 
differ in this regard from other particular normative facts, such as particular facts 
about what is right and wrong, which are widely assumed to always have such 
explanations. Berker puts the point as follows: 
[W]hat about facts of the form [Fact [r] is a reason for agent S to φ]? Must such 
facts always obtain in virtue of other facts? That they might not seems very 
much to be a live theoretical option. While it is mystery mongering to hold that 
the wrongness of what I did last week is a brute fact that cannot be explained, 
it is not necessarily mystery mongering to hold that nothing explains why what 
it’s like to be in agony is a reason for me to avoid future agony. (Berker, 2019: 
931; notation adjusted) 
Based on this, Berker proposes that the Reasons-First view should be especially 
attractive to non-naturalists—roughly, those who take normative facts to be ‘different 
in kind from’, or ‘irreducible to’, natural facts. According to Berker, the best version 
of non-naturalism implies that at least some particular normative facts are not 
grounded in natural facts.36 And reasons-facts, he thinks, are good candidates for 
being such facts—as he puts it, “the reason relation is an excellent candidate for a 
non-resultant normative relation” (2019: 931). 
However, support-explanationism provides an alternative account of the 
possibility that reasons-facts are unusual in this way. If reasons-facts are themselves 
facts about what explains what, asking what explains why r is a reason to φ is akin to 
asking what explains why r explains why φ-ing enjoys (some amount of) normative 
support. It is thus akin to asking for an explanation of an explanation, which is quite 
different from asking for an explanation of a non-explanatory fact, whether 
normative or otherwise. (Compare the question ‘Why did the bridge collapse?’ to 
‘Why does the fact that there was an earthquake explain why the bridge collapsed?’, 
or the question ‘Why did you run?’ to ‘Why does the fact that you want to get in shape 
explain why you ran?’) This, we submit, is why reasons-facts might appear to be 
exceptions to the general rule that particular normative facts are always at least 
partially explained by natural facts—the rule is not usually meant to include facts 
about normative explanations themselves. This isn’t to say that facts about 
explanations can’t themselves have explanations (cf. Bennett, 2011). Our point is just 
that it’s unsurprising that facts like [The fact that donating to charity helps alleviate 
                                                   
36 We disagree. Instead, we think non-naturalism is best understood as the view that one or 
both of the following are true: (i) that fundamental normative principles cannot be explained 
by natural facts (cf. Fogal and Risberg, 2020), and (ii) that what it is to be right, wrong, 
normatively supported, or to have any other normative property cannot be explained in fully 




suffering helps explain why you should donate to charity] are intuitively different 
from facts like [You should donate to charity], and the former don’t always cry out 
for explanation in the same way, or to the same degree, as the latter. 
Importantly, our diagnosis of the (at least purportedly) unusual status of reasons-
facts is compatible with them being analyzed in terms of normative support, and with 
particular support-facts obtaining (at least partly) in virtue of particular natural facts. 
Thus, we submit, Berker’s suggestion that some reasons-facts might lack grounding 
explanations does not provide reason for non-naturalists to be Reasons-Firsters, or 
otherwise take reasons-facts to be unanalyzable. 
5.2 Redundant reasons 
Support-explanationism also provides a straightforward account of what Wodak 
(2020b) calls redundant reasons—facts which count in favor of certain actions but 
cannot explain why we ought to do them. Wodak argues that the possibility of such 
reasons is incompatible with ought-explanationism. He provides the following 
example: 
The Gods Reward the Rational. You face a choice between φ and φ*. All things 
considered, you ought to do φ (for reasons r, r*, and r**). The Gods appear 
before you and tell you that, if you do whatever you ought to do, They will 
reward you with an eternity of pleasure in the afterlife. (Wodak, 2020b: 268; 
notation adjusted) 
The problem, Wodak says, stems from two apparent truths: first, the fact that the 
Gods will reward you if you φ—call that fact [Reward]—is a reason for you to φ; but, 
second, while it is true that you ought to φ—call that fact [Ought]—it is not the case 
that [Reward] explains [Ought]. Instead: 
[Reward] is true only because of [Ought]: [Ought] cannot then be true because of 
[Reward]. In this sense, [Reward] is a ‘redundant reason’: it counts in favour of 
doing φ but cannot explain [Ought]. (Wodak, 2020b: 268; notation adjusted) 
However, even if redundant reasons pose a potential problem for ought-
explanationism, they are easily accommodated by support-explanationism. (Other 
explanationist views that analyze reasons in terms of a gradable normative notion 
can accommodate redundant reasons as well, but we’ll focus on support-
explanationism.) In The Gods Reward the Rational, facts r, r* and r** together provide 
some amount of support, d, for φ. Because φ* is supported to some lesser degree, you 
ought to φ. When the Gods show up, their promise provides additional support for φ. 




to a higher degree than just d. Support-explanationism thus entails that [Reward] is a 
reason to φ, as desired. 
Now, Wodak may be right that [Reward] is explained, at least in part, by the fact 
that φ is antecedently well-supported, and better supported than the alternatives. But 
it’s unmysterious, and compatible with the asymmetry of explanation, that a fact 
about an amount of something can help explain a subsequent increase in the amount 
of that same thing. For example, if somebody has a lot of money, this can help explain 
future monetary gains—i.e., why her net wealth increases. This doesn’t entail that her 
having a lot of money explains why she has a lot of money, but only that the fact that 
she started with a certain amount of money explains (together with other facts) why 
she tends up with a larger amount of money. She starts out rich and ends richer. 
Similarly, in The Gods Reward the Rational, φ starts out well-supported and ends with 
even more support. 
A version of Wodak’s objection that targets support-explanationism specifically 
thus fails. It would go something like this: suppose r provides a certain amount of 
(pro tanto) support, d, for φ-ing. The Gods tell you that if you do whatever there is d 
support for doing, they will reward you. As it turns out, the fact that they make this 
promise provides exactly the same amount of support, d, for φ-ing. Support-
explanationism makes sense of this: initially, there is only one source of support for 
φ-ing (i.e., r), and when the Gods make their promise, that constitutes a second, 
equally strong source of support for φ-ing. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
A recurring theme in this paper has been that support-explanationism accommodates 
many considerations that have been taken to favor rival views while avoiding their 
flaws. Among other things, it captures the close connection between reasons and 
explanation without facing the objections that plague alternative explanationist 
views, such as the problem of outweighed reasons (see §3). Similarly, it 
accommodates the main motivations for the Reasons-First program—such as the 
slogan that ‘you ought to do what you have most reason to do’, and the insight that 
contributory normative notions should be seen as fundamental—while avoiding its 
problems (see §4). If this is correct, why has support-explanationism been 
overlooked? And why has Reasons-First instead become such an influential position 
in the metanormative debate? While we cannot do full justice to these questions here, 
we’ll offer some partial and speculative answers to them in closing. 
The basic idea behind the Reasons-First view is clear enough, and at first glance, 
this idea might seem highly attractive. Importantly, however, the central theses of 
this view are often expressed in ways that are, in crucial respects, less-than-fully 
precise. As noted, this is true even of the opening statement of Scanlon’s 1998 book, 




tradition. To some extent imprecision in expression is understandable: after all, in 
ordinary language, terms like ‘reason’ and ‘reasons’ are arguably polysemous, 
context-sensitive, and combine with other expressions (such as ‘gives’, ‘is’ and 
‘provides’) in ways that are both complex and confusing. As we hope to have shown, 
however, paying attention to such seemingly insignificant details can have a major 
impact on how one answers many of the most fundamental metanormative 
questions, including those that concern the nature of normative reasons themselves. 
Besides illustrating the importance of clarifying one’s terminology, methodology, and 
subject matter when formulating one’s metanormative views, it also raises the 
question of whether the apparent attraction of the Reasons-First view is really 
genuine. We suspect not—instead, as already suggested, it may be largely the result 
of Reasons-First not being clearly distinguished from views that are subtly but 
importantly different, such as support-explanationism (and the related but optional 
‘Support-First’ program). We believe, however, that once their differences are made 
clear, support-explanationism emerges as the preferable alternative.37 
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